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BALANCING THE SCALES: LIMITING THE
PREJUDICIAL EFFECT OF EVIDENCE RULE
404(b) THROUGH STIPULATION
I. Introduction
American jurisprudence is grounded in the theory that we try
cases rather than persons.' Accordingly, Federal Rule of Evidence
404(a) prohibits the use of evidence regarding a person's character
or trait of character if offered strictly for the purpose of proving
that the defendant acted in conformity with such character on a
particular occasion.2 In addition, Rule 404(b)3 incorporates com-
mon law rules prohibiting the introduction of other crimes, wrongs,
1. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 503-04 (Mich. 1988).
2. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) provides:
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occa-
sion, except:
(1) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by
the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence
of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution
in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Evidence of the character of a witness as provided in Rules 607, 608,
and 609.
3. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the char-
acter of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during
trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
At the time of this writing, the United States Senate has passed Amendment No.
1105 to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993, S. 1607, which
provides for two new Rules of Evidence, Rules 413 and 414, essentially amending
Rule 404(b) in sexual assault and child molestation cases. In relevant part Rule 413
states:
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of
sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bear-
ing on any manner to which it is relevant.
Rule 414 is identical in all respects to Rule 413 except that the words "child molesta-
tion" are inserted wherever "sexual assault" appears.
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or acts4 if offered to prove the character of a person or action in
conformity with such character.5
A basic exception to Rule 404(b), however, expressed in the sec-
ond sentence of the rule, provides that evidence of prior bad acts is
admissible to prove, among other things, "motive, opportunity, in-
tent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake
or accident .... 6 Even if evidence of prior bad acts is relevant and
satisfies one or more of the Rule 404(b) "good purposes, ' 7 such
evidence may nevertheless be excluded under Rule 4038 if the trial
judge, balancing the probative value of the evidence against the
potential unfair prejudice to the accused, finds such evidence un-
duly prejudicial. 9
4. Referred to in this Note as "prior bad acts."
5. See United States v. Lynn, 856 F.2d 430, 434 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Rule 404(b)
codifies the common law prohibition against the admission of propensity evidence -
that is, evidence presented to encourage the inference that because the defendant
committed a crime once before, he is the type of person to commit the crime currently
charged.").
6. FED. R. EvID. 404(b). The prior bad acts evidence need not portend criminal
liability. Rather, the evidence is admissible if there is sufficient evidence to support a
finding by a jury that the defendant committed the acts. Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (holding that there is no requirement that the prior criminal
activity result in a conviction). Nor does prior bad act evidence need to constitute
criminal behavior in order to be admissible as prior "bad acts." RICHARD 0.
LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURo, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 216 n.44
(1982).
7. Rule 404(b) does not limit the purposes for which prior bad acts evidence can
be offered to those enumerated in the Rule (motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident). Rather, it expressly
provides that the good purposes contained therein are neither exhaustive nor conclu-
sive and that other non-for character purposes may justify admission of prior bad acts
evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
8. Rule 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
The Rule 403 balancing test was designed to override all other evidentiary rules.
JACK WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 403[01](1982). Yet, the use of Rule 403 in conjunction with Rule 404(b) by the federal judici-
ary has generally not entailed any major limitations on the admission of prior bad act
evidence. Thomas J. Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence After Adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 113, 116 (1984). "The reason
lies in the balancing process itself. Rule 403 requires the court to weigh prejudice to
the accused against the probative value of the evidence to the prosecution. Logically,
therefore, the stronger the probative value of the evidence the more likely such evi-
dence will be admitted, despite the risk of substantial prejudice to the defendant." Id.
9. See United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979). Unfair prejudice, in this context, means an undue tendency
390
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The danger of prejudice is heightened in those cases where the
government seeks to introduce prior-bad-act evidence to prove a
criminal defendant's intent, notwithstanding a defendant's offer to
stipulate that the defendant possessed the requisite intent for the
commission of the charged crime. 10 Despite a trial court's instruc-
tion to the jury that the prior bad acts are to be considered only for
non-character purposes, such as intent, rather than as an inference
that because the defendant committed an act in the past he is more
likely to have committed the act presently charged, it can no longer
be presumed that juries follow instructions regarding prior bad acts
evidence. "[T]he practical and human limitations of the jury sys-
tem cannot be ignored."" Jurors tend to draw a "complete, inte-
grated image of personality" from negative, fragmented
information about a person, and "it appears certain that when the
law requests jurors to give character evidence a restricted use, it
demands 'a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only the jury's
power, but anybody else's.'"12
Admission of prior-bad-act evidence in the face of an intent stip-
ulation is, therefore, highly prejudicial because it tends to weigh so
heavily as to over-persuade a jury to convict a defendant, not be-
cause she is guilty of the crime charged, but because she has com-
mitted bad acts in the past. This result conflicts with the firmly
rooted notion that a person ought not to be convicted of doing a
specific bad act because she is a bad person generally; 3 rather, the
accused need only answer for the crime with which she is currently
charged.' 4
to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emo-
tional one. See FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
10. In such cases, the defense essentially states that if the trier of fact believes the
accused committed an act, the accused will stipulate to having the requisite intent for
the commission of the crime.
11. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968).
12. Robert G. Lawson, Credibility and Character: A Different Look at an Intermi-
nable Problem, 50 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 758, 774 (1975) (quoting Nash v. United
States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1932)). While consciously deciding whether to
infer the accused's subjective bad character from the accused's prior bad acts, at a
subconscious level the jurors may be tempted to punish the accused for the other
crimes. John T. Johnson, The Admissibility of Extraneous Offenses in Texas Criminal
Cases, 14 S. TEX. L.J. 69 (1973).
13. United States v. Fierson, 419 F.2d 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 1970).
14. See Thomas J. Reed, Trial by Propensity: Admission of Other Criminal Acts in
Federal Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 731 (1981); Kathleen E. Weidner,
State v. Ellis: The Other Wrongful Acts Rule, Survey of Nebraska Law-Evidence, 15
CREIGHTON L. REV. 281, 284 (1981).
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It is undeniable, however, that some prior bad acts are relevant
to prove a defendant's intent to commit the crime with which she is
charged.' 5 A defendant faced with such unquestionably relevant,
yet prejudicial evidence may find it beneficial to stipulate to intent
in order to preclude the admission of prior-bad-act evidence at
trial. For defendants, the choice to enter into such a stipulation is
premised on the theory that once intent is stipulated, or at least not
formally contested, any evidence of prior-bad-act has no probative
value on the issue of intent, is cumulative, and remains highly prej-
udicial, thus signalling exclusion of the evidence under Rule 403.16
The Second Circuit has taken the lead in limiting the prejudicial
effect of prior-bad-act evidence under Rule 404(b) by permitting a
defendant to stipulate to the requisite intent for the crime charged,
thereby excluding prior-bad-act evidence offered to prove intent. 17
Conversely, prosecutors in the Ninth Circuit are per se permitted to
introduce prior-bad-act evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b) regard-
less of a defense offer to stipulate intent. The Ninth Circuit rea-
sons that, where intent is an element of the crime, the prosecution
must affirmatively prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that "[t]his burden is not relieved by a defendant's promise to
forego argument on an issue," or by stipulation.'8
The United States Supreme Court passed on an opportunity to
resolve the troubling issue of whether a stipulation or promise by a
defendant not to contest intent can preempt the government from
offering prior-bad-act evidence for the purpose of proving intent.' 9
At the same time, the admissibility of prior-bad-act evidence is the
single most important issue in contemporary criminal evidence
law,2" and the effect of stipulations on the admission of Rule 404(b)
evidence is confronting courts more frequently.21 The numbers
confirm the importance. Rule 404(b), which is in effect in over
15. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160 (1st Cir. 1993); United States
v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1989) (discussing admissibility of prior bad acts for purposes stated in Rule 404(b)).
16. See, e.g., Hadley, 918 F.2d at 848 (defendant arguing that an intent stipulation
removes intent as a controverted issue, and probative value of proof evidencing intent
is overshadowed by prejudice, signaling exclusion of evidence per Rule 403).
17. See Colon, 880 F.2d at 650.
18. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 852.
19. The Supreme Court, after granting certiorari in Hadley v. United States, 112 S.
Ct. 1261 (1992), and after hearing oral arguments, dismissed the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted, 113 S. Ct. 486 (1992) (per curiam).
20. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct: One of the Most Misunder-
stood Issues in Criminal Evidence, 1 CRIM. JUST. 6,7 (1986).
21. United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160, 1175 (1st Cir. 1993).
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thirty states as well as federal practice,22 has generated more pub-
lished opinions than any other subsection of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.23 Moreover, the circuit courts that have addressed the
matter are not in complete accord.24
This Note argues that, in a prosecution for a violation of a spe-
cific intent criminal statute, the government must accept a defend-
ant's clear and unambiguous stipulation to possessing the requisite
intent for the crime charged. The trial court must ensure that the
proffered stipulation is voluntarily given, unambiguous, and com-
prehensive, so as not to deprive the prosecution from presenting
forceful, significant, and probative evidence. Once a defendant of-
fers such an acceptable stipulation, however, the government's in-
troduction of prior bad acts to prove intent becomes extremely
prejudicial, while any probative value the evidence may have is dis-
sipated entirely.
Part II of this Note examines the disparate circuit court decisions
regarding the use of stipulations in lieu of prior-bad-act evidence,
and discusses the United States Supreme Court's view on the pol-
icy of liberally admitting prior-bad-act evidence. Part III resolves
this issue by proposing to exclude prior-bad-act evidence to prove
intent when intent is clearly stipulated.
H. Disparate Decisions Regarding Prior Bad Acts Evidence
Since the enactment of Rule 404(b), circuit courts have been di-
vided as to whether a stipulation of intent by a defendant precludes
admission of prior-bad-act evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b).25
A. The Second Circuit's Approach
The Second Circuit has taken the lead in balancing the interests
of defendants and prosecutors with regard to Rule 404(b) evi-
22. RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL., MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE 2
(Supp. 1989).
23. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MILITARY RULES OF EvIDENCE MANUAL 361
(2d ed. 1986) ("heavily litigated in federal and military courts"); JACK B. WEINSTEIN
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 404[081, at 404-56 (1989).
24. United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317, 322 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he cir-
cuits remain divided as to whether stipulations or concessions by the defense can take
intent out of the case."); see also United States v. United States v. Doherty, 675 F.
Supp. 714,716 (D. Mass. 1987) ("The circuit courts that have addressed the matter are
not in complete accord.").
25. Compare United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a
clear and unambiguous stipulation precludes prior bad act evidence) with United
States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that, notwithstanding stipula-
tion, prosecution may still offer prior bad act evidence to prove intent).
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dence. It has held that evidence of prior-bad-act is not admissible
to prove intent unless intent is actually controverted.2 6 Accord-
ingly, the Second Circuit affirmatively permits the accused to stipu-
late to possessing the required intent and, thereby, to remove the
issue from deliberation. Thus, the accused may prohibit the admis-
sion of prior-bad-act evidence to prove intent.27
In United States v. Colon,28 the defendant was charged with dis-
tributing heroin. The government alleged that an undercover po-
lice detective approached Colon and asked if he had any "D" (a
street name for heroin). Colon pointed, and said, "Wait over
there." The detective looked in the direction Colon was pointing
and saw Luis Alvarado observing the two men. Alvarado mo-
tioned with his head-a gesture the detective interpreted as an in-
vitation to approach. Without any statement by the detective,
Alvarado asked, "How many?" and the undercover agent re-
sponded that he wanted two. Alvarado then removed two glassine
envelopes containing heroin from inside his pants and gave them to
the agent and, in return, was given pre-recorded money.29 Once
the agent returned to his car, other detectives and backup officers
moved in and arrested Colon and Alvarado.3 °
One of Colon's defenses was that he had not 'steered' the under-
cover agent to a specific drug seller; rather, he had merely re-
sponded to the buyer's request for drugs by innocently pointing to
the general direction of drug activity down the street.31 "Colon
would have pointed one way if asked where the Statue of Liberty
was, and another if asked where drug activity was." 32
The government attempted to admit testimony concerning Co-
lon's two prior drug steering convictions, arguing that the evidence
was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to establish
Colon's intent and knowledge.33 Colon's counsel, in turn, offered a
26. See United States v. Manafzadeh, 592 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1979).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that in
appropriate cases a defendant may remove intent as an issue by a clear stipulation
admitting intent).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 653.
30. Id.
31. Counsel for Colon stated that the defendant "happened to be there. Someone
approached him and asked him, do you know where you can buy drugs, and he said
down the block someplace, I guess. That doesn't make him a steerer. He doesn't
know Alvarado, he never knew Alvarado in his life and he maintains his innocence."
Id.
32. Daniel J. Capra, The Supreme Court and Use of Prior Bad Acts to Prove In-
tent, N.Y. L.J., May 8, 1992, at 3.
33. 880 F.2d at 653.
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stipulation stating that if "the government proves that [Colon]
knew Alvarado and was in fact directing [the detective] to Alva-
rado specifically, in saying that you can buy the drugs from him,
then [Colon] will acknowledge that he intended to violate the fed-
eral narcotics law and intended to aid in the sale of drugs. 34
Over the defendant's objection, and notwithstanding the defend-
ant's proffered stipulation, the trial court permitted the prosecu-
tion to introduce evidence concerning Colon's prior convictions for
narcotics steering.35 After the trial judge instructed the jury that
the prior-bad-act evidence was offered only to prove intent, knowl-
edge, and motive, and not to show Colon's character or propensity
to commit the charged crime, Colon was convicted.36
On appeal, the Second Circuit noted the danger of unfair preju-
dice associated with the use of prior-bad-act evidence. The court
stated that trial courts must exercise great care to ensure that juries
are not persuaded to convict a defendant merely because the de-
fendant has committed a similar crime before.37 In some cases, the
court suggested, defendants may specifically offer to stipulate in-
tent and thereby remove it as an issue.38 The court wrote:
A defendant may completely forestall the admission of the other
act evidence on the issue of intent by express[ing] a decision not
to dispute that issue with sufficient clarity that the trial court will
be justified (a) in sustaining objection to any subsequent cross-
examination or jury argument that seeks to raise the issue and
(b) in charging the jury that if they find all the other elements
established beyond a reasonable doubt, they can resolve the is-
sue against the defendant because it is not disputed.39
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit held that Colon's proffered stip-
ulation was properly rejected by the trial court because it was illu-
sory40 The court reasoned that Colon's proffered stipulation
conceded nothing on the issue of intent, as the government would
still have to prove that Colon meant to point the detective specifi-
cally to Alvarado and not generally down the street.41 In effect,
the stipulation said, "if you can prove I did it, I admit that I in-
34. Id. at 654.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 655.
37. Id. at 656.
38. Id. at 657.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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tended it."42 Since the stipulation sought to restrict the govern-
ment's ability to prove intent by prohibiting use of prior-bad-act
evidence, while conceding nothing, the trial court's refusal to ac-
cept the proffered stipulation was proper.43
Despite the outcome in Colon, the Second Circuit's position of
accepting clear and unambiguous stipulations in specific intent
crimes in lieu of prior-bad-act evidence is well established and
dates back to at least 1978. In the case of United States v.
Manafzadeh,4" the defendant was convicted on two counts of un-
lawfully transporting or causing to be transported falsely made
checks in interstate commerce. 45 At trial, Manafzadeh denied any
involvement in the creation or negotiation of the fraudulent
checks.46 The prosecution attempted to introduce evidence that,
approximately four months after the events forming the basis of
the indictment, Manafzadeh used a false name and passport while
attempting to deposit $10,000 in a bank. 7
Manafzadeh's counsel objected to the admission of the prior-
bad-act evidence as irrelevant, arguing that the only issue in the
case was whether the defendant had participated in the creation or
deposit of the forged checks in the case at trial.48 Defense counsel
repeatedly offered to stipulate that, if the jury found that
Manafzadeh had participated in the creation or deposit of the
forged checks, the defense would concede that the acts had been
done with the necessary criminal intent, thereby removing any dis-
pute as to this issue.49 The trial judge nevertheless admitted the
prior-bad-act evidence and instructed the jury that the evidence
was to be used only for deciding the question of the defendant's
guilty intent in the crime charged in the indictment.5
The Second Circuit reversed Manafzadeh's conviction, 51 stating
that while the prior-bad-act evidence was relevant to intent, the
42. Capra, supra note 32, at 3.
43. United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650, 658 (2d Cir. 1989). Although the court
refused to accept Colon's proffered stipulation, his conviction was nonetheless re-
versed and the matter remanded for a new trial. The court reasoned that it was re-
versible error for the trial court to admit Colon's prior bad act evidence in the
government's opening and case-in-chief. Rather, admission of such evidence should
await presentation of the defendant's case.
44. 592 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1978).
45. Id. at 83.
46. Id. at 85.
47. Id. at 81.
48. Id. at 85.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 86.
51. Id. at 91.
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issue before the jury was not Manafzadeh's intent, but whether
Manafzadeh was involved in the creation or deposit of the six
fraudulent checks alleged in the indictment. 2 Since the issue of
intent was uncontroverted, and since any doubt about its non-exist-
ence as an issue was dispelled by the offered stipulation, 3 the court
rejected the admissibility of prior-bad-act evidence to prove in-
tent. 4 Manafzadeh, more clearly than any other case, sets forth
the proposition that a defendant's stipulation to possessing the re-
quired intent eliminates intent as a triable issue.5
52. Id. at 87.
53. Id.
54. Id. "Defense counsel did not argue the issue of intent to the jury, having al-
ready informed the district court that if the jury found the defendant had created the
checks or caused them to be deposited, which was the Government's theory of the
case, Manafzadeh would stipulate to the requisite intent." Id. (citing United States v.
O'Connor, 580 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978)).
55. The Second Circuit has also held that a defendant's choice of defense may
remove intent from the case. Under this approach, if the defense proceeds solely on a
theory that the defendant did not commit the charged act, evidence of prior bad acts
is inadmissible to prove intent. Alternatively, if the defendant proceeds on a theory
that he or she did the act innocently or mistakenly, or if the defendant merely pleads
not guilty and contests the strength of the prosecution's evidence, an issue of intent is
raised, and prior bad act evidence is admissible. See United States v. O'Connor, 580
F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978) (hold-
ing that where defendants did not claim that they took the money innocently or mis-
takenly, but rather claimed they did not take the money at all, intent and knowledge
were not raised as issues); United States v. DeCicco, 435 F.2d 478, 483-84 (2d Cir.
1970) (holding that a claim of non-participation in the charged crime does not raise an
issue of intent). Even in Manafzadeh, the court held that had the defendant not of-
fered to stipulate to intent, but merely denied involvement in the crime, intent would
not be disputed and the government would be precluded from introducing other acts
evidence to prove intent. 592 F.2d at 87; see United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900 (2d
Cir. 1988) (defendant's desire to defend on grounds of mistaken identity did not raise
an issue of intent).
United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1989), is also instructive on this aspect
of the Second Circuit's analysis of prior bad act evidence. In Colon, the defendant
alternatively argued that he was never approached by an undercover detective, and
never engaged in a discussion about drugs with anyone. The court held that use of this
"denial defense" did not raise the issue of intent. It is for this reason that introduction
of prior bad act evidence should await presentation of the defendant's case. Since the
trial court admitted Colon's prior bad act evidence to prove intent before hearing
Colon's defense (which did not raise the issue of intent), his conviction was reversed.
For a critique of the Second Circuit's position, see Bruce Green, "The Whole Truth?":
How Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers Deceitful, 25 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 699 (1992).
The Second Circuit's position on this issue is mirrored by the Third, Fourth, and
Fifth Circuits. See United States v. Schwartz, 790 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1986); United
States v. Hernandez, 975 F.2d 1035 (4th Cir. 1992); and United States v. Silva, 580
F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Adderly, 529 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1976).
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The Fifth Circuit is in accord with the Second Circuit's position
in Colon and Manafzadeh. In United States v. Merkt,56 for exam-
ple, the Fifth Circuit held that a defendant can make an "appropri-
ate stipulation to avoid the introduction of extrinsic offense
evidence."57 Similarly, in United States v. Roberts,"8 the Fifth Cir-
cuit wrote that where a defendant unequivocally removes intent by
stipulation, prior-bad-act evidence cannot be admitted for the pur-
pose of proving intent.5 9 This is so, the court wrote, because a stip-
ulation dissipates any probative value of the prior-bad-act evidence
so that the remaining probative value is nominal and is outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice. 60 The First,61 Eighth,62 Elev-
enth,63 and District of Columbia Circuits' also allow stipulated in-
tent to prevent the prosecution from proving intent through the
use of prior-bad-act evidence.
B. The Ninth Circuit's Rejection of Stipulations
United States v. Hadley65 is the paradigmatic case that presents
the Ninth Circuit's approach to prior-bad-act evidence. In 1989
Verl Hadley was convicted of several violations of the Sexual
56. 794 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987).
57. Id. at 963 (quoting United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379, 383 n.2 (5th Cir.
1980)).
58. 619 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1980).
59. Id. at 383.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that
defendant's offer to stipulate intent will prevent the admission of prior bad act evi-
dence by removing the issue from the case; government must therefore accept prof-
fered stipulation); United States v. Ferrer-Cruz, 899 F.2d 135 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding
that since no formal stipulation had ever been offered, evidence of uncharged miscon-
duct was properly admitted to prove intent).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Burkett, 821 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding
that uncharged misconduct evidence properly admitted to prove intent even though
defendant notified government of his intent to offer alibi defense as this was insuffi-
cient indication that he would stipulate intent).
63. United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting
United States v. Costa, 947 F.2d 919, 925 (11th Cir. 1991)) (stating it is well settled
that the government may introduce evidence of the defendant's extrinsic acts to prove
intent if the defendant does not "affirmatively take the question of intent out of con-
tention by stipulation ...[to] the requisite intent"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2289
(1992); United States v. Russo, 717 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that if a defend-
ant enters into a stipulation concerning intent, any nominal probative value of the
extrinsic evidence would undoubtedly be outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice).
64. See, e.g., United States v. Manner, 887 F.2d 317 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (uncharged
misconduct admissible to prove intent where there was no explicit offer to stipulate
intent), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990).
65. 918 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Abuse Act of 1986. 66 Complaints of sexual molestation led to an
investigation of Hadley, which resulted in an indictment charging
him with sexual abuse involving minors.67
At trial, one victim testified to three separate incidents of sexual
molestation that were not listed in the indictment.68 In addition,
over Hadley's objection and pursuant to Rule 404(b), the district
court admitted testimony from other victims who stated that Had-
ley had forcibly sodomized them when they were minors.69 The
trial court held that because violations of the Sexual Abuse Act
were specific intent crimes, which required that the defendant en-
gage in sexual contact with "intent" to "arouse the sexual desire of
any person,"70 the prior bad acts were probative of Hadley's intent
to commit the charged offenses.7 ' The court further concluded that
because the probative value of the evidence as to intent was not
substantially outweighed by the prejudice to the defendant, the evi-
dence was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.72
Hadley was convicted and, on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, ar-
gued that the trial court erred in admitting the uncharged prior-
bad-act testimony.73 Hadley argued that, when a defendant denies
participation in the act or acts that constitute a crime,74 intent is
66. Id. at 850. Specifically, Hadley was charged with aggravated sexual abuse in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1) (1986) and abusive sexual contact in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2244(a)(2) (1986).
67. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 850. These incidents were not part of the charges in the
indictment alleged against Hadley.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. To demonstrate sexual contact, the government had to prove that Hadley ac-
ted "with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sex-
ual desire of any person." 18 U.S.C. § 2245(3) (1986).
71. Petitioner's Brief, Joint Appendix at 682-83, Hadley, 918 F.2d at 848 (District
Court Trial Proceedings Transcript). It should be noted that the new amendment to
Rule 404(b), incorporated in Rule 414, would provide automatic admissibility of prior
bad acts in cases of child molestation for any relevant purpose.
72. Id. at 682-83.
THE COURT: And, intent, of course, is an element of 2244. It specifically
refers to with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or gratify
the sexual desire of any person .... So intent is an element .... The prior
bad acts that we were discussing.., have to do with the alleged activities of
Mr. Hadley, of a sexually gratifying nature. So I think those acts, prior acts,
would be relevant in the jury's consideration, not necessarily limited to
whether Mr. Hadley did the acts, but his purpose in doing them as well.
73. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 850.
74. In the alternative, Hadley argued on appeal that intent was an uncontroverted
issue because intent was evident from the nature of the alleged acts alone. Peti-
tioner's Reply Brief at 1, Hadley, 918 F.2d at 848. Hadley argued that the requisite
intent was necessarily inferred from the act of touching someone on their sexual or-
gans. At trial, Hadley's counsel stated:
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not a material issue for the purpose of applying Rule 404(b). 75
Thus, Hadley claimed the uncharged misconduct evidence was ir-
I believe that there is no question that if somebody touches somebody else's
penis, there is a sexual motive in it. We are not going to argue otherwise. It
would be absurd to argue that if someone touches someone else's sexual
organs he did so innocently. The intent can be inferred from the act, if the
jury believes it.
Petitioner's Brief, Joint Appendix at 662, Hadley, 918 F.2d at 848 (District Court Trial
Proceedings Transcript). In support of this argument, Hadley relied on United States
v. Gruttadauro, 818 F.2d 1323, 1328 (7th Cir. 1987), which held that evidence of prior
bad acts is inadmissible in cases where the mental state can be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances. Id. at 1328; see also United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d
1016 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 939 (1990); United States v. Harrod, 856
F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Manganellis, 864 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1984) (where intent can be in-
ferred from act, government need not prove this element of the crime). The Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument, however, finding that in a specific intent prosecution,
the prosecution must prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 852
(quoting In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). But see Gruttadauro, 818 F.2d at 1327-
28 (stating that where the mere doing of an act demonstrates criminal intent, evidence
of other misconduct offered to prove general or specific.intent is immaterial); United
States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1975) (evidence of other crimes excluded in
cases involving specific intent crimes when intent required by statute could be in-
ferred from nature of act); Landrum v. United States, 559 A.2d 1323 (D.C. App. 1989)
(where performance of act would indisputably show criminal intent, prior bad acts are
inadmissible).
Yet, most federal courts agree that a bare plea of 'not guilty' places a defendant's
state of mind and intent in issue, and the prosecution is not relieved from proving this
element of the charge. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Mazzanti, 888 F.2d at 1165 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Colon,
880 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Nahoom, 791 F.2d 841 (11th Cir. 1986);
United States v. McKoy, 771 F.2d at 1207 (9th Cir. 1985) (discussing the proposition
that a plea of not guilty does not relieve the prosecution from proving intent as an
element of the crime charged). But see, Thomas J. Reed, The Development of the
Propensity Rule in Federal Criminal Causes 1840 - 1975, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 299, 307
n.62 (1982).
75. United States v. Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting United
States v. Powell, 587 F.2d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 1978)).
In his appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Petitioner's Brief at 30 & 34,
Hadley, 918 F.2d 848, Hadley based his argument on the Ninth Circuit's prior decision
in Powell, 587 F.2d at 443. In Powell, the Ninth Circuit reversed the defendant's con-
viction of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, due to the trial
court's error in admitting Powell's prior convictions for similar offenses to prove in-
tent. Such admission was reversible error, the court wrote, because Powell denied
participation in the crime, and therefore, intent was not a material issue for purposes
of applying Rule 404(b). Id.
Similarly, in Hadley, the defendant's defense at trial was a denial of participation in
the charged sexual misconduct. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 850. Moreover, Hadley went
further than Powell by offering to formally stipulate to the requisite intent if the jury
believed the acts were committed. Petitioner's Brief at 18, Hadley, 918 F.2d at 848.
Despite this offer, the Hadley court held that in a specific intent crime, intent is al-
ways a material element of the case whether or not the defendant actively disputes
intent. Id. at 852.
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relevant and inadmissible. Moreover, Hadley stated that he had
conceded the issue of intent approximately five months before
trial7 6 and had offered to stipulate intent during trial.77
Notwithstanding the offered stipulation and the use of the "de-
nial defense," the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's admission
of the prior-bad-act evidence and affirmed Hadley's conviction.78
The Ninth Circuit stated that the government bore the burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
This burden, the court held, was not relieved by the defendant's
promise to forego argument on the issue of intent.79
Applying Rule 403, the Ninth Circuit found that the evidence
was "highly probative on the question of intent, especially in light
of the similarity found between the prior acts and the offense
charged.""0 The court recognized that the evidence was obviously
prejudicial, but stated that the district court sufficiently limited the
prejudicial impact by instructing the jury that the prior-bad-act evi-
* dence could be used to establish intent only if they first found, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, that Hadley had committed the acts
charged.8' The court concluded that the prejudice to Hadley did
not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.8 2
The Ninth Circuit, thus, created a per se rule that permitted the
government to introduce prior-bad-act evidence to prove intent,
notwithstanding a defendant's denial of involvement in the crime
or offer to stipulate to intent. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed
76. Petitioner's Brief at 18, Hadley, 918 F.2d at 848.
77. Petitioner's Brief, Joint Appendix at 687, Hadley, 918 F.2d at 848 (District
Court Trial Proceedings Transcript):
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT: ... since this evidence [uncharged prior
sexual abuse] is being apparently admitted to show sexual intent, what if we
stipulate that if the private parts of the individuals were in fact touched, that
it was with sexual intent. And then simply have the issue about whether or
not it occurred go to the jury. And that way we would .officially eliminate
that issue.
78. Hadley, 918 F.2d at 853.
79. Id. at 852. The Court wrote:
Hadley cannot preclude the government from proving intent simply by fo-
cusing his defense on other elements of his crime. Hadley's choice of de-
fense did not relieve the government of its burden of proof and should not
prevent the government from meeting this burden by an otherwise accepta-
ble means. Rule 404(b) permits the government to prove intent by evidence
of prior bad acts, and ... admission of such proof in this case was not an
abuse of discretion under the rule.
Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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its position, stating that, "[r]egardless of the [defendant's] willing-
ness to stipulate, the government is entitled to prove the [crime] by
introduction of probative evidence. '8 3 The Seventh Circuit mirrors
this approach with regard to both the "denial defense" and the
stipulated intent.8
C. The McGuire Standard
The recent United States Supreme Court case of Estelle v. Mc-
Guire,85 may indicate that the Court is prepared to allow expansive
use of uncharged misconduct to prove intent in criminal cases. Mc-
Guire was convicted in state court for the second degree murder of
his infant daughter.86 Over McGuire's objections, and despite his
claims that he did not commit the charged act, the trial court ad-
mitted evidence that the infant had suffered extensive and serious
injuries on many occasions prior to death.87
McGuire filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court.
The Ninth Circuit granted McGuire's petition and ruled that evi-
dence of the infant's prior injury was erroneously admitted since
the prosecution could not link McGuire to the prior injuries.8 8 The
court concluded that admission of the evidence "rendered [Mc-
83. United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States
v. Gilman, 684 F.2d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v, Kalama, 549 F.2d 594,
596 (9th Cir. 1977). The unwillingness of courts to force the prosecution to accept a
criminal defendant's stipulation is based on the long-standing rule that "the criminal
accused cannot plead out an element of the charged offense by offering to stipulate to
that element." Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Right to 'Plead Out' Issues and Block the
Admission of Prejudicial Evidence, 40 EMORY L.J. 341, 357, 358 (1991).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 492 (7th Cir. 1992) (Cudahy,
J., concurring) (arguing that the specific-intent exception of the Seventh Circuit auto-
matically precludes defendants charged with specific-intent crimes from ever remov-
ing intent as an issue in the case, even by stipulation); United States v. Draiman, 784
F.2d 248, 254 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that defendant's decision not to contest intent
does not relieve prosecution from burden of proving intent in a specific intent crime
prosecution); United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 821 (1978); United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir.) (holding
that in cases involving specific intent crimes, intent is automatically an issue, regard-
less of whether the defendant has made intent an issue in the case), cert. denied 490
U.S. 1075 (1989); United States v. Mazzanti, 888 F.2d at 1165, 1171 (intent must al-
ways be proven notwithstanding defendant's decision not to contest issue, by for ex-
ample, defending on grounds of denial of participation in crime); United States v.
Chaimson, 760 F.2d 798, 805 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[w]here the Government must prove
specific intent as an element of the crime charged, evidence of the other acts may be
introduced to establish that intent.").
85. 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991).
86. Id. at 478.
87. Id. at 478, 479.
88. Estelle v. McGuire, 902 F.2d 749, 753 (9th Cir. .1990).
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Guire's] trial arbitrary and fundamentally unfair" in violation of
due process requirements.8 9
The issue presented to the Supreme Court in McGuire was simi-
lar to that addressed in Hadley: whether uncharged misconduct is
relevant to intent when the defendant does not dispute intent and
defends on the ground that he did not commit the crime. Answer-
ing affirmatively, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision
and affirmed McGuire's conviction.90
Although McGuire was a state criminal case decided on constitu-
tional grounds, and although it did not deal with the Federal Rules
of Evidence, it nonetheless evinces an expansive approach to the
admissibility of prior-bad-act evidence. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, reasoned that the "prosecution's burden to
prove every element of the crime is not relieved by a defendant's
tactical decision not to contest an essential element of the
offense." 91
Because the prosecution had charged McGuire with second-de-
gree murder, it was required to prove that the infant's death was
caused by the defendant's intentional act.92 Proof of the prior inju-
ries helped to do just that; although not linked by any direct evi-
dence to McGuire, the evidence demonstrated that the infant's
death was the result of an intentional act by someone, and not an
accident.93 The Court reasoned that evidence of the prior injuries
helped to prove that "the child died at the hands of another and
not by falling off the couch, for example. ' 94 Since the factor of in-
tent was unconditionally relevant and probative on the question of
the intent with which the person who caused the injuries acted,95
the Court concluded that the evidence of prior injuries was admis-
sible, whether directly linked to McGuire or not.
That McGuire dramatically expands the use of prior bad acts evi-
dence is clear in light of the Supreme Court's previous statement
on the subject in United States v. Huddleston.96 In Huddleston, the
89. Id.
90. 112 S.Ct at 479.
91. Id. at 481. This result in McGuire seems to reject the Second Circuit's position
that in a prosecution for a specific intent crime, a choice of defense such as non-
participation in the crime relieves the prosecution from the burden of proving intent.
See supra, note 56 and accompanying text.
92. 112 S. Ct at 480.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 485 U.S. 681 (1988). In this case a defendant charged with selling stolen goods
in interstate commerce appealed his conviction arguing that a trial court must make a
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Court held that similar act evidence is admissible pursuant to Rule
404(b) "only if the jury can reasonably conclude that the act oc-
curred and that the defendant was the actor."97 Yet, in McGuire,
the Court found the evidence of prior injuries admissible even
though the government could not prove that the defendant caused
the injuries.98
It should be noted, however, that McGuire never formally of-
fered to stipulate that the infant had been intentionally injured by
someone, though not him. Such a stipulation would arguably have
taken intent out of the case insofar as the Supreme Court found it
relevant. 99 The reasoning in McGuire, therefore, will not prevent
the Court from holding, in a case concerning Rule 404(b), that stip-
ulation of intent can prevent the prosecution from using prior bad
acts to prove intent.10°
III. Limiting The Prejudicial Effect of Rule 404(b) by
Implementing a Per Se Rule to Accept Stipulations
The differing circuit court opinions set the stage for Hadley's ap-
peal to the Supreme Court, essentially setting forth one question:
to what extent does a defendant's refusal to contest intent prevent
the prosecution from proving intent through prior-bad-act evi-
dence? 10 1 Hadley relied on the Second Circuit's approach,02
preliminary finding that the Government has proven the occurrence of prior bad act
evidence by a preponderance of the evidence before such evidence was admitted pur-
suant to Rule 404(b). The Court concluded that such evidence be admitted if there is
sufficient evidence to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed the
prior bad act, a lower standard than that proposed by the defendant. Id. at 683.
97. Id. (emphasis added). The conditioning of the evidence on a finding that a
defendant committed the act is required by the conditional relevance standard in
Rule 104(b) which states: "When the relevancy of evidence depends upon fulfillment
of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition." FED. R.
EVID. 104(b).
98. 112 S.Ct at 480. The difference, of course, between the results is that in Mc-
Guire, the prior injuries were unconditionally relevant, since they proved that some-
one had intentionally harmed the child, and that factor itself was relevant. In contrast,
in Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 681, the defendant was charged with knowing possession of
stolen merchandise, and the uncharged misconduct concerned Huddleston's prior
possession of stolen merchandise. See Capra, supra, note 32.
99. Capra, supra note 32. This was unfortunate for McGuire, whose defense was
that his wife, and not he, had intentionally injured the child.
100. While Mcguire and Hadley are thus distinguishable, McGuire nonetheless
presents an expansive approach to the use of prior bad acts evidence to prove intent.
The extent to which McGuire will signal courts to take an expansive view of prior bad
act evidence under Rule 404(b), despite a defendant's offer to stipulate, is unclear.
101. Petitioner's Brief at i, Hadley, 918 F.2d at 848.
102. Id.
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stressing that precedent in that circuit "clearly allows the defense
to take the issue of intent out of the case, if they are willing to so
stipulate.' 10 3 Hadley argued that a court should carefully review
proposed stipulations focusing on the "incremental probative value
of the proffered evidence, its prejudicial effect, and the availability
of other means of proof."'" After granting certiorari, the Court
dismissed it as improvidently granted,0 5 leaving unresolved the
question of whether the Ninth or Second Circuit has taken the cor-
rect approach to Rules 404(b) and Rule 403.
The Ninth Circuit's approach concerning prior-bad-act evidence
is erroneous because it leaves room for admission of prejudicial
evidence despite a defendant's offer to stipulate to intent. The fed-
eral courts should adopt a per se rule that would exclude uncharged
prior-bad-act evidence offered solely to prove intent, when the de-
fendant has clearly and unambiguously stipulated intent. Accept-
ance of stipulations in appropriate cases comports not only with
the theory behind the Federal Rules of Evidence, but also with the
scope of the Rules.
A. Relevance and the Rules
In evaluating the admissibility of prior-bad-act evidence under
Rule 404(b), several circuits have developed a four-part test: (1)
that a material issue has been raised for which prior-bad-act evi-
dence is admissible under Rule 404(b);10 6 (2) that the evidence is
relevant; (3) that the jury could find that the prior-bad-act occurred
and that the defendant was the actor; 0 7 and (4) that the prior act is
"similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the charge at
trial."' 0 8
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 113 S. Ct 486 (1992) (certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted), cert. de-
nied, 113 S.Ct 1068 (1993).
106. These are the "good purposes" listed in Rule 404(b), see supra notes 3 & 7 and
accompanying text.
107. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct 475
(1991), it is questionable whether the trier of fact must still determine that the defend-
ant committed the acts. However, McGuire did not directly deal with Rule 404(b),
therefore this prerequisite may still be required. See supra notes 87-102 and accompa-
nying text.
108. See United States v. Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Miller, 959 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 382 (1992);
United States v. Frederickson, 601 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 934
(1979) (discussing a four prong test to determine admissibility of prior bad act
evidence).
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A corollary to this four-step requirement is that the probative
value of the prior-bad-act evidence must not be substantially out-
weighed by undue prejudice. 1°9 Rule 403 makes evidence inadmis-
sible if the evidence tends to induce juries to think illogically and
employ an improper basis in reaching convictions. 110 Prior-bad-act
evidence often leads a jury to convict an otherwise innocent de-
fendant on the theory that she is a "bad person" deserving of pun-
ishment. 1 ' Where an issue is uncontested, the probative value of
evidence regarding the issue is substantially outweighed by the risk
of prejudice. Therefore, Rule 403 mandates that the prior-bad-act
evidence be excluded in favor of a defendant's clear stipulation to
possessing the requisite intent. 112
An admission of intent by stipulation, therefore, should preclude
the use of prior-bad-act evidence to prove intent. Once intent is
stipulated, the prior-bad-act evidence is of minimal probative value
to prove intent and remains highly prejudicial, thus mandating ex-
clusion of that evidence under Rule 403."13
The same conclusion is mandated by other rules of evidence.
The Federal Rules of Evidence were designed "to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and the proceedings justly deter-
mined."' 14 A central theme of the Rules is that the fact-finder as-
109. Miller, 959 F.2d at 1538; see FED. EVID. R. 403.
110. FED. R. EVID. 403. Unfair prejudice, in this context, means an undue tendency
to suggest a decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one. See FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note. Furthermore, evi-
dence is prejudicial when it tends to have some adverse effect upon a defendant be-
yond tending to prove the fact or issue that justified its admission into evidence. See
FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note; STEPHEN SALTZBURG & KENNETH R
REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 43 (2d ed. Supp. 1978). The preju-
dicial effect may be created by the tendency of the evidence to prove some adverse
fact not properly in issue or unfairly to excite emotions against the defendant. United
States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 943 (2d Cir. 1980).
In addition, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 404(b) expressly require that
the trial court consider less prejudicial alternatives to proving intent than prior bad
act evidence. The determination must be made 'whether the danger of undue preju-
dice outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other
means of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under
Rule 403. FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
111. See United States v. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("The exclu-
sion of bad acts evidence is founded not on a belief that the evidence is irrelevant, but
rather on a fear that juries will tend to give it excess weight, and on a fundamental
sense that no one should be convicted of a crime based on his or her previous
misdeeds.").
112. Id.
113. United States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1979).
114. FED. R. EvID. 102.
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certains the truth through the evaluation of relevant evidence, 115 or
as the Supreme Court explained in Huddleston v. United States," 6
through evidence that makes the existence of any fact at issue more
or less probable." 7 This concept stems from the application of the
relevancy doctrine encompassed in Rules 401 and 402, under which
evidence is not admissible unless it is relevant, 1 8 probative of a
point of consequence, and material to an action." 9 Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 explicitly codifies this premise by defining relevant
evidence as evidence having a tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more or less probable. 120 Yet, a stipulation as to intent admits the
issue and removes it as a material issue of consequence.' 2 ' Admit-
ting prior-bad-act evidence in the face of a stipulation, therefore,
has no tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more or less probable
than it would be without the stipulation. This conclusion stems
from the fact that the stipulation admits the contested issue-in-
tent-thereby dissipating any probative value inherent in the use
of prior-bad-act evidence on the issue of intent.' 22 Since intent is
not "truly in dispute", 23 and because the defendant has "affirma-
tively taken the issue of intent out of the case' 24 through an effec-
tive stipulation, the admission of prior-bad-act evidence to prove
intent pursuant to Rule 404(b) must be precluded.
B. Stipulations and the Rules
The next issue to consider is whether the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence can be read to give the defendant the right to stipulate in-
tent. The Advisory Committee's Notes on the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence imply that the Rule 403 balancing process can
require a party to accept his opponent's stipulation. 125 In addition,
the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 404(b) expressly requires
115. Respondent's Brief at 17, Hadley, 918 F.2d at 848.
116. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
117. Id. (emphasis added).
118. See FED. R. EvID. 402.
119. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 8, § 404[09].
120. FED. R. EvID. 401.
121. Federal Evidence Rules 401 and 402 state that admissible evidence is evidence
that is relevant; that is, evidence must be material to an issue of consequence.
122. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 23, § 190, at 452 n.52.
123. United States v. O'Connor, 580 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1978).
124. United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 868
(1978).
125. FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's note.
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that the trial court consider alternatives to proving intent that are
less prejudicial than prior-bad-act evidence. 26 A reasonable alter-
native is the use of stipulations.
The utility of judicial admissions and stipulations is well estab-
lished, and they are used broadly in civil litigation as well as in
criminal cases. 27 Indeed, the prevailing practice is to accept
stipulations. 128
Although Rule 404(b) does not limit admissibility of evidence to
"issues in dispute," it is implicitly limited by the relevancy standard
of Rules 401 and 402.129 The Advisory Committee's Note concern-
ing Rule 401 states that while evidence can be relevant if offered
for undisputed matters,'130 it directs that "situations will arise which
call for the exclusion of evidence offered to prove a point conceded
by the opponent.' 13 1 The Note further states that a rule excluding
evidence in such a situation can be justified under Rule 403.132 The
Committee's reasoning is that if a point is undisputed, and evi-
dence is nonetheless offered to prove the point, the evidence be-
comes cumulative; therefore, the probative value is minimal since
the proponent's case is not significantly advanced. 33
In considering the significance of an offer to stipulate intent, a
court must place emphasis not on "the form of words used by
counsel but on the consequences that the trial court may properly
attach to those words."'1 34 Courts must be satisfied that the intent
126. The determination must be made whether the danger of undue prejudice out-
weighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the availability of other means
of proof and other factors appropriate for making decisions of this kind under Rule
403. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) advisory committee's note.
127. Patrick M. Wall, Judicial Admissions: Their Use in Criminal Trials, 53 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY 15, 19, 25-26 (1962).
Allowing stipulations in civil litigation, but refusing to allow them in criminal cases,
creates a "classification" triggering the equal protection clause. The differential treat-
ment accorded to criminal defendants by the unfair classification runs afoul of the
equal protection guarantee and is, therefore, unconstitutional. See also Edward J. Im-
winkelried, The Right to "Plead Out" Issues and Block the Admission of Prejudicial
Evidence: The Differential Treatment of Civil Litigants and the Criminal Accused as a
Denial of Equal Protection, 40 EMORY L.J. 341 (1991).
128. WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 8, § 404[09]; EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 8:11 (1984).
129. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 402 (only evidence probative of controverted issues is
relevant and therefore admissible).
130. FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee's note.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See United States v. Colon, 880 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1989); supra notes 27-30, 42-
43 and accompanying text.
134. Colon, 880 F.2d at 657 (quoting United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 939, 942
(2d Cir. 1980)).
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stipulation meets two requirements. First, the offer must express a
clear and unequivocal intention to remove the issue from contro-
versy-unlike the illusory stipulation in Colon. Second, the stipu-
lation must cover the necessary substantive ground to remove the
issue from the case. 35 Moreover, the court must ascertain, outside
the presence of the jury, that the defendant is competent to enter
into a stipulation and that the stipulation is made knowingly and
voluntarily.136 Once a stipulation has been approved, the court
must instruct the jury that it must resolve the issue of intent against
the defendant because it is not disputed. 37
C. The Prosecutor's Burden: An Unfounded Fear
Despite the well-established acceptability of stipulations, the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits continue to admit uncharged, prior-
bad- act evidence to prove intent 38 notwithstanding the defend-
ant's offer to stipulate intent. 39 These courts stress that a stipula-
tion is a voluntary agreement between parties 40 and, as such, the
prosecution has no obligation to accept a stipulation' 4 1 and should
not be compelled to do so. 142 These courts contend that a defense
offer to stipulate cannot deprive the prosecution of the right it
would otherwise have to introduce prior-bad-act evidence, 43 and
therefore, such an offer does not bind the prosecution. Moreover,
135. United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160, 1174 (1st Cir. 1993).
136. United States v. Salery, 830 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
137. United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 942 (2d Cir. 1980) (such an instruction
would be appropriate where defendant expresses with sufficient clarity, by stipulation
or otherwise, a decision not to contest the element of intent; error to admit prior bad
act); see also, United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233, 237-38 (7th Cir. 1973) (trial court
correctly declined to instruct jury on definition of interstate commerce where parties
stipulated that element was satisfied), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
138. Curiously, the Ninth Circuit, prior to Hadley, had required the government to
accept appropriate stipulations in criminal cases. As early as 1976, just one year after
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Durcan, 539 F.2d 29, 30 (9th Cir. 1976), held that the government should have ac-
cepted the defendant's proffered stipulation to having committed prior burglaries.
The court wrote that "[i]n the interest of fairness the trial court should have com-
pelled the prosecution to accept the pertinent stipulation. The prejudice to the de-
fendant by not accepting [the stipulation] so far outweighed the proofs probative
value that the evidence should have been excluded."
139. State v. Smith, 644 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983); State v. Clemons,
643 S.W.2d 803 (Mo. 1983). See generally, Paul C. Giannelli & Edward J. Im-
winkelried, Stipulations in Criminal Cases, CRIM. DEF. 4 (May-June 1983).
140. State v. Smith, 644 S.W.2d at 701.
141. Id.
142. United States v. Lowe, 569 F.2d 1113 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 435 U.S. 932
(1978).
143. Id.; Smith, 644 S.W.2d at 701.
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these courts argue that a bare intent stipulation, without facts de-
tailing the nature of the prior bad acts, can deprive the government
of the legitimate force of its evidence and unfairly limit the flow
and quantity of evidence.'"
Furthermore, the fear may be that an offer to stipulate, if re-
quired to be accepted as a matter of law, would require the govern-
ment to accept any stipulation offered by the defendant and, thus,
would allow the defendant an unlimited ability to control the proof
presented by the government at trial.145 These concerns, however,
are unfounded. The Supreme Court in Huddleston held that Rule
104(a) provides that "questions concerning the qualification of...
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court,' 46
based solely on the discretion of the trial judge.147 Therefore, the
trial judge, pursuant to Rule 104, ultimately controls the admissibil-
ity of stipulations.
Moreover, Rule 611(a) explicitly grants the trial judge broad dis-
cretion over the "mode" of evidence so as to make the presenta-
tion of evidence "effective for the ascertainment of the truth.' 1 48
Given this broad authority, the trial court can exercise its power to
ensure that a defendant's stipulation fully concedes a controverted
issue, so as not to prevent the prosecution from presenting incrimi-
nating evidence. Indeed, Colon is an example of this proposition-
the Second Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to accept the
proffered stipulation because it was illusory and conceded nothing
on the issue of intent. 49
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits also rely on the "plain meaning"
analysis of the Federal Rules of Evidence to preclude stipulations
with respect to prior-bad-act evidence. 50 The "plain meaning"
144. United States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192, 1197 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 956 (1981).
Yet, the Fifth Circuit seems to support the petitioner's position in Hadley. In
United States v. Spletzer, 535 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1976), the defendant was charged
with escape from federal custody. One element of the crime is that the defendant
must have been in custody pursuant to a judgement or conviction. Spletzer offered to
stipulate to the conviction element of the crime. The Fifth Circuit held that the gov-
ernment must accept the proffered stipulation.
145. Grassi, 602 F.2d at 1197.
146. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
147. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686.
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 26-43 and accompanying text.
150. See Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 681; United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct 2503
(1992). In both cases, the Supreme Court espoused a literal interpretation of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, demurring to provide protection to criminal defendants when
those protections are not specifically in the Rules. Hence these cases stand for the
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analysis notes that Rule 404(b) does not explicitly permit a defend-
ant to prevent the admission of evidence by the use of stipula-
tions.151 This reasoning, however, analyzes Rule 404(b) in a
vacuum and does not take into account Rules 104(a), 403, and 611
and the relevancy standard of Rules 401 and 402.
D. A Per Se Proposal
The federal courts should, therefore, adopt a per se rule which
would prohibit uncharged prior-bad-act evidence offered solely to
prove intent when the defendant has stipulated to having the requi-
site intent. To implement the proposal offered here, the court
should first determine whether the defendant wishes to stipulate to
having the requisite intent.1 52 If the defendant agrees to so stipu-
late, the trial court should then ensure, pursuant to Rules 104(a)
and 611(a), that a proffered stipulation is clear and unequivocal so
as not to unfairly preclude the prosecution from offering relevant
evidence to prove the crime. Once a stipulation clearly states that
the defendant possessed the required intent, the court has the ex-
plicit authority under the Rules to direct the government to accept
the stipulation, 53 and to instruct the jury that, as a result of the
judicial admission, the prosecution need not prove that element of
the crime. "The ultimate responsibility for the effective working of
the adversary system rests with the trial judge,"' 54 and the trial
judge must exercise that power to limit the potentially prejudicial
effect of evidence offered under Rule 404(b).
IV. Conclusion
The important issue concerning a defendant's proffered stipula-
tion, highlighted by a split in the circuit courts, should be squarely
addressed by the United States Supreme Court. The recent
Supreme Court pronouncement in Estelle v. McGuire on the ex-
pansive use of prior-bad-act evidence in a criminal case' 55 has
clouded the issue and has created more questions than answers.
The extent to which McGuire will signal the federal courts to take
"plain meaning" interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence; supra notes 66-85
and accompanying text.
151. Id.
152. United States v. Garcia, 983 F.2d 1160, 1175-76 (1st Cir. 1993) (a survey of the
circuits on stipulations in the area of 404(b) evidence indicates a preference for han-
dling the matter before trial, or early in the trial process).
153. See supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
154. FED. R. EvID. 611 advisory committee's note.
155. See supra notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
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an expansive approach to such evidence in Rule 404(b) cases is
unclear. One thing is certain, however-until a clear pronounce-
ment is made by the Court, the uniformity of law that the Federal
Rules of Evidence seek to establish 156 will continue to be frus-
trated, and results will differ depending on the court.
Instead, in cases where an accused is prosecuted for a specific
intent crime, an unequivocal offer to stipulate intent should be ac-
cepted in lieu of prior-bad-act evidence showing intent. This pro-
posal stems from the fact that a stipulation admits an element of
the crime and removes the issue from contention. Evidence admit-
ted by the prosecution to prove admissions already offered in a
stipulation is cumulative, and its probative value is outweighed by
prejudice. Such prejudicial evidence must be excluded because it
breeds a tendency to condemn, not because an accused is believed
to be guilty of the act charged, but because she has committed
other offenses. 57 This hardly comports with the notion of funda-
mental fairness that "in our system of jurisprudence, we try cases,
rather than persons.' '1 58
The per se rule suggested in this Note is consistent with the no-
tions of fairness and relevance set forth in the Federal Rules. The
proposal allows the defendant to protect herself from prejudicial
evidence, and yet it also allows the prosecution to present all rele-
vant, reliable evidence on those matters that are disputed. Assum-
ing that a stipulation is clear, the prosecution has no bona fide
reason to reject the stipulation and has no need to use prior-bad-
act evidence to prove intent. Any argument to the contrary by the
government must only stem from its desire to put before the jury
explicit prior-bad-act evidence in the hope that the jury's opinion
of the defendant will be predisposed toward conviction. It is just
such a scenario, however, that Rule 404 was intended to pro-
hibit.159 Only by approaching a case with such reasoned logic and
judicial honesty can courts limit the prejudicial effect of Rule
404(b) and once again balance the scales of justice.
Daniel J. Buzzetta
156. See generally S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974), reprinted in [1974]
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7054.
157. JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 194 (1904).
158. People v. Allen, 420 N.W.2d 499, 503-04 (Mich. 1988).
159. United States v. Anthony, 712 F. Supp. 112, 117 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
